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Abstract
1
 
 
The increasing powers of the European Parliament (EP) in recent decades have made the EP a 
more attractive institution for ambitious politicians keen to build their political career in the 
EU’s multi-level system. A key contribution to the debate about the career paths of MEPs is 
Scarrow (1997). Her work, which identified three different career paths taken by MEPs, has 
been widely cited and used as a basis for other studies on this topic. Building on Scarrow’s 
work, this paper describes two additional categories of MEPs – former national politicians 
and ‘one-off’ MEPs – and links MEPs’ careers with their activities in Parliament. It finds that 
over and above the factors that have previously been identified as influential on an MEP’s 
behaviour, his or her career path and ambitions are relevant in explaining certain legislative 
behaviour across member states and party groups.  
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Introduction 
 
Politicians are not only focused on reaching desired policy outcomes; they also consider how 
their legislative participation can enhance their individual career ambitions. In Ambitions and 
Politics, Schlesinger (1966) observed that politicians change their behaviour in accordance 
with their career ambitions. Politicians are not only interested in serving the needs of their 
current constituents but are also forward-looking in identifying the constituents that they 
would like to serve in the future. A multi-level governance system, such as the EU, provides 
an interesting laboratory for examining politicians’ ambitions.  
The new powers granted to the EP from the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s placed 
MEPs on an equal footing with the Council in most policy areas, making the EP a more 
attractive institution for ambitious career politicians. MEPs can be at very different stages of 
their career when they enter the EP. This has also changed over time. At the beginning of the 
1980s, many MEPs had political experience at the national level, something that was less the 
case in the 1990s (Beauvallet & Michon, 2010). A key contribution to the debate about the 
career paths of MEPs is Scarrow (1997). Her work, in which she focuses on how EP 
membership fits into the political career paths of MEPs, has been widely cited and used as a 
basis for other studies on this topic. Scarrow captures the different types of career paths in 
three categories: 1) the young ‘stepping-stone’ politicians aiming for a career in domestic 
politics; 2) the long-term ‘EP-careerists’; and 3) the short-term MEPs close to retirement or 
looking for a career outside politics.  
Building on Scarrow’s work, and that of those who have followed her, this paper 
considers whether Scarrow’s approach of using a politician’s career background as an 
indicator for predicting future career ambitions is sufficient. It is likely that a politician’s 
career background, combined with age, does not provide enough information to identify all 
3 
 
the different career trajectories of MEPs. Adding observed behaviour to the analysis should 
improve our understanding of a politician’s career ambitions. It is argued that linking past 
experience with observed behaviour and career ambitions identifies two other categories of 
MEPs in addition to the three already described by Scarrow, and would improve our 
understanding of the different career ambitions of MEPs. The first new category is of MEPs 
who have already had a political career at national level, but are not close to retirement. 
Because of the increase in powers of the EP over the past few decades, building a career in the 
EP has become an interesting alternative option for these politicians. The second new 
category is of ‘one-off’ MEPs who only stay in the EP for a short period of time. They have 
no political experience, nor do they pursue one after their time in the EP. This category covers 
a range of different profiles, for example party loyalists who have been rewarded by their 
national party or non-political public figures. It may also include politicians who were 
expected to be promising candidates but turn out to be poor quality politicians.  
As Hall (1996) argues for the representatives in the US Congress, parliamentarians face 
two decisions on every issue that comes up: which position to take and how active to be. This 
paper will examine whether the career paths of MEPs can explain their level of legislative 
activity and whether using observed behaviour can provide a better indication of career 
ambition than considering past experience alone. For this paper an original dataset is used 
which includes data of MEPs who were active in the first half of the sixth EP (2004-07). The 
impact of the different types of MEPs on behaviour is analyzed in a number of OLS 
regression models where certain types of activities were included as dependent variables. The 
empirical findings broadly confirm the existence of different types of MEPs, and their 
associated career trajectories in the multi-level EU context. Those MEPs interested in 
developing a career in the EP are generally more active, in particular in those areas which fit 
within their career paths. MEPs who are not aiming for – or able to secure – a long-term 
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career in the EP, focus their activities on other areas, some of which are probably outside the 
EP. This is in line with Schlesinger’s finding of politicians who change their behaviour in 
accordance with their career ambitions.  
The career paths of MEPs are relevant to their level of engagement and should not be 
ignored in future studies on their activities. The analysis in this paper shows that there are 
types of MEPs that can be identified across countries and across party groups, and that this 
can in certain situations explain an MEP’s behaviour. Therefore, over and above these factors 
of influence that have already been identified to have an impact on the legislative activity of 
an MEP and the ambition they demonstrate, career paths are a further relevant factor that 
should be taken into account. This paper shows that combining past career activities with 
observed activity in Parliament, leads to better predictions about a politician’s career 
ambitions than looking at someone’s career background in combination with age alone.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, existing literature on political ambition theory and 
the career paths of MEPs is discussed and it is explained why the categorization developed by 
Scarrow should be expanded. Second, the link is made with the activities of MEPs, and 
hypotheses are put forward which set out the possible expected differences in activities 
between the different types of MEPs. After an explanation of the operationalization of the 
variables, the empirical results are presented and discussed.  
 
Different types of MEPs and their levels of activity 
 
In contemporary politics, where becoming a politician is considered to be a profession in 
itself, it is important to understand the career ambitions of politicians. Career politicians not 
only focus on policies that aim to benefit society, they also consider how their legislative 
participation can enhance their individual ambitions. It can be expected that politicians adjust 
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their behaviour to increase their chances of being promoted to their preferred political 
position. Some politicians will look to move to a higher political office whereas others wish to 
pursue a career in the legislature they are currently in, or leave politics altogether. These 
career ambitions are expected to impact the choices politicians make in their current position. 
Schlesinger (1966), in one of the first comprehensive attempts to study political career 
ambitions, identified that political ambitions can manifest themselves in three different forms: 
discrete, static and progressive. Discretely ambitious politicians only seek to be in office for a 
limited period of time whereas politicians with static ambitions aim to stay in office for as 
long as possible. The third category of progressive politicians describes those who seek to 
obtain a higher political office. 
Careers influence the way politicians behave and participate; a key incentive here is the 
desire to get re-elected. Politicians aiming to be re-elected, or elected to a different office, can 
be expected to direct their activities towards achieving that goal. Hibbing (1986) showed for 
example that Representatives in the House of Congress alter their voting behaviour in line 
with the constituency that they hope to serve in the future. Russo (2011) identified that re-
election incentives can have a significant influence on the behaviour of MPs in the Italian 
Parliament. He found that seeking re-election, either as a constituency MP or as a local 
politician, incentivizes parliamentarians to engage in constituency service. Concerns of re-
election have an impact on politicians’ activities as is also shown by Bernacker (2014) in his 
analysis of activities of MPs in the German Bundestag, where he found that MPs from 
opposition parties competing in marginal seats are significantly more active in Parliament 
than colleagues who are more secure of keeping control of their seat. In the UK context Allen 
(2012) proved that the political experience a politician obtains prior to becoming an MP can 
influence his behaviour once elected and impact his future career trajectory. This shows that 
re-election, or election to a different office, affect the behaviour of politicians in the 
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institution they are active, which explains the importance of linking the different types of 
politicians to their activities in Parliament. 
Schlesinger’s political ambition theory has been widely applied in the US (see e.g. 
Black, 1972, Rhode, 1979, Hibbing, 1986), but less so in the EU context, while its multi-level 
governance system provides an interesting opportunity to consider political career ambitions 
(Borchert & Stolz, 2011). In the EU, national political office is still considered to be the 
highest political office and elections to the EP are therefore still seen as ‘second-order’ (Hix 
& Marsh, 2011). However, for professional politicians, the creation and the development of 
the EP has provided new career opportunities and various ways of moving between territorial 
levels have become possible (Borchert & Stolz, 2011). It can be assumed that in this multi-
level setup, politicians optimize their behaviour in pursuit of their career goals.  
Scarrow (1997) studied the political experience and career paths of MEPs from the four 
countries with the largest delegations in the EP (France, Germany, Italy and the UK). She 
considered MEPs' previous elective office experience, both at national and sub-national level, 
and identified three different categories. First, a group of MEPs who use their EP membership 
as a stepping-stone towards election to national political office. Second, a group of MEPs who 
are committed to their European role for a longer period of time, which she calls the 
‘European careerists’. Third, a group of MEPs who stay in the EP for only a short space of 
time following retirement from national elected office, or who use their brief EP membership 
as a stepping-stone towards a position in non-elective public office or in the private sector. 
The direct election of the EP and its increase in powers has made this institution an interesting 
career opportunity for politicians. It has been argued that for a growing number of actors, the 
EP provides for a route to political professionalization and development (Scarrow, 1997; 
Stolz, 2001). Evidence suggests that it is indeed the case that more and more MEPs build a 
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career in the EP (Whitaker, 2014) and develop as an elite with a European political career 
(Verzichelli & Edinger, 2005). 
Scarrow has not been the only contributor to the academic literature on the career paths 
of MEPs. Apart from more descriptive information about the background of MEPs which is 
available in some textbooks (e.g. Corbett et al., 2011), a limited group of scholars has focused 
in more detail on EP candidates’ experience in national or regional politics, or MEPs’ post-EP 
career (e.g. Beauvallet & Michon, 2010; Hobolt & Høyland, 2011; Meserve et al., 2009; 
Gherghina & Chiru, 2010; Hix et al., 2012). The overall number of studies on career paths 
and ambitions of MEPs covering pre- and post-EP positions is, however, small, in particular 
in comparison with the number of studies available on US Congressmen's career paths. For 
those studies which are available, Scarrow’s categorization is often still, at the very least, a 
point of reference. An example of the application of Scarrow’s categorization is Poguntke et 
al. (2007), who use Scarrow’s typology to describe the development of a distinctive EP career 
path and the impact that such a path might have on national parties’ policy positioning. In 
Hix, Raunio & Scully (2003) too, which takes stock of fifty years of research on the EP, 
Scarrow is the main author mentioned in the context of career paths of MEPs. Given that 
Scarrow’s work dates back nearly twenty years, it is important to assess the extent to which 
her work is still applicable or needs to be updated. It can be questioned whether a politician’s 
career background, combined with age, is a sufficient indicator of future career ambition and 
provides enough information to identify all the different career trajectories of MEPs. 
Analyzing career background and its effect on observed behaviour could provide a better 
explanation and prediction about a politician’s career ambitions. This paper aims to connect 
the career paths of MEPs with observed behaviour in order to reach more credible conclusions 
about the different career ambitions that politicians demonstrate.  
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In this paper, it is argued that the expansion of the powers of the EP has attracted a new 
type of politician. These are politicians who have already had a career at national level, either 
as an MP or a member of government, whose political life at national level has come to an 
end. For these politicians, a career in the EP has now become an interesting alternative. It 
could be argued that these MEPs simply become EP careerists as already described by 
Scarrow. However, there are a few reasons why these two categories are distinct from each 
other. An MEP with a previous domestic political career can be expected to have closer 
connections with the national party and have a greater network among politicians who are still 
active in domestic politics. Given the importance of inter-institutional connections for 
example with the Council (Høyland, 2006), an MEP with a domestic political background 
might be better positioned to take on certain rapporteurships which could enhance his ability 
to build a career in the EP compared with an EP careerist. MEPs with a domestic political 
background are more likely to enter at a higher level in the EP with a better chance of 
obtaining high-profile rapporteurships or senior positions. National experience means that a 
politician has already proven his qualities. This is likely to give these politicians an advantage 
over EP careerists. 
It is also thought that the category of retiring politicians and those who are an MEP for 
only a short period of time, as described in Scarrow’s analysis, in fact encompasses two 
different types of MEPs who behave differently and have different career ambitions. This 
category should therefore be split into two: one for EP retirees and another for MEPs who are 
elected for a short period of time and who are not career politicians; a category which could 
be referred to as ‘one-off’ MEPs. This type of MEP does not typically have a domestic 
political career either before or after his time in the EP, and typically stays in the EP for two 
terms at most. It is important to separate this new category of ‘one-off’ MEPs from the 
retiring MEPs as these two groups have very different interests in participating in the EP’s 
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work. The former group includes party loyalists who have been rewarded by their party with 
one or two terms in the EP for service to the party, but who do not pursue a political career 
there. It also includes MEPs who are public figures outside of politics and who are able to 
appeal to certain parts of the electorate. Finally, this category also includes MEPs who turn 
out to be poor-quality politicians and who are deemed unfit for a political career at either the 
European or domestic political level. For this last group of ‘one-off’ MEPs, their ambition 
might never be truly revealed as they are considered to be poor-quality politicians. It must be 
admitted that this category is difficult to operationalize and may consist of further 
subcategories. This category is heterogeneous which makes it difficult to develop a theoretical 
expectation. The results of any analysis of this category will therefore need to be interpreted 
with caution as the theoretical expectations for this group can be multiple. However, the fact 
that the ‘one-off’ MEPs have very different backgrounds, as well as very different career 
ambitions from the retiring MEPs has an impact on the activities they are expected to show 
and justifies their existence as a distinct category.  
In this paper, it will be tested whether the different types of MEPs show different levels 
of activity in the Parliament. The activities and participation of MEPs can be measured in 
many different ways. In his study of the US Congress, Hall (1996) identified two modes of 
legislative participation of Congressmen: formal and informal. Much of MEPs’ work takes 
place in formal committees and the plenary, while informal work often takes place behind the 
scenes without any official note-taking. Formal participation can, however, often be seen as a 
good indicator of who has participated behind the scenes (Hall, 1996). An MEP who takes up 
a rapporteurship can be expected to spend considerable time not only on drafting a report, but 
also talking to EP colleagues, other EU institutions and lobbyists. The formal participation of 
a rapporteur is thereby an indication of considerable informal participation as well. 
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Hypotheses  
 
As discussed, one could expect that different types of MEPs would display different levels of 
activity, as they are at different stages of their career, are of different ages, and have different 
work experience and career goals. For the first type, the young and unexperienced MEPs, it 
could be expected that they would try to use their time in the EP as a training period for a 
career in domestic politics and to build up a profile for the national party leadership. They 
could therefore be expected to be less actively involved in the detailed legislative work of the 
EP, but rather to spend a considerable amount of time with the national party and their 
constituency. These lower levels of activity by young and unexperienced politicians was also 
found Bailer and Ohmura (2013) in their analysis of the German Bundestag, where they 
showed that young politicians had lower levels of activity at the beginning of their political 
career than the average Member of the Bundestag.  
For the second type, the MEPs who are close to retirement, it could be expected that, 
although they have domestic political experience, they are in the process of winding down 
their political life, and this should be noticeable in their activities. It could be expected that 
these MEPs have little or no interest in engaging actively in the day-to-day work of the 
Parliament in terms of tabling motions, asking questions or writing reports. The effect was 
found elsewhere as well, for example, in the German Bundestag (Bailer & Ohmura, 2013). 
The EP-careerists, the third type of MEP, on the other hand, are focused on a long-term 
career in the EP and could be expected to be particularly keen to develop good relationships 
with the EP and European party group (EPG) leadership. They would therefore be expected to 
participate actively in the Parliament’s work. The idea that politicians who are member of a 
legislature for a longer period of time are more actively involved in the institution’s work, is 
also found at national level legislatures, for example in Poland where experienced MPs are 
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more deeply involved in the legislative process than newcomers (Shabad and Slomczynski, 
2002).  
For the fourth type of MEPs, the new category of politicians with national experience, 
who are looking to build a career in the EP, it could be expected that they would show levels 
of active engagement similar to that of the EP-careerists. However, they are likely to enter at a 
higher level given their national experience and are more easily able to build up a senior 
profile in the EP relatively quickly than the EP careerists. This should help them in obtaining, 
for example, relevant rapporteurship positions while not necessarily displaying the same level 
of effort in being involved in the day-to-day work of the EP (e.g. attending plenary voting 
sessions) as EP careerists do. This fourth type of MEPs is more likely to acquire certain 
privileges from early on.  
The fifth type of MEPs, those who only stay in the EP for a relatively short period and 
who are not career politicians, could be expected to have limited interest or capability in 
impressing the political leadership of either their national party or EPG. They would therefore 
not show significant levels of activity or involvement in the Parliament’s work. This group 
also includes MEPs who turn out to be of poorer quality than expected and are therefore given 
less responsibility than other MEPs. This should be visible, for example, in the number of 
rapporteurships they are awarded, which should be relatively lower. At the same time the poor 
quality MEPs might still show activity levels similar to national or EP careerists in areas over 
which they have complete control and for which they do not need the support from their 
political leadership, such as attending plenary sessions. As discussed before, this group is 
heterogeneous and consists of a number of subcategories which makes the development of 
theoretical expectations difficult. It is therefore important that this category is set up as a 
separate group, distinct from the other categories of MEPs. Although desirable, breaking up 
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this category further into subcategories would be very complicated and an analysis of the 
MEPs’ characteristics at such individual level would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
MEPs' activity levels are, however, unlikely to be explained by their career trajectory 
alone, and other factors should therefore also be taken into account by including them as 
control variables in the analyses; these are mentioned in the operationalization section of this 
paper. Finally, the committee that an MEP belongs to could also be expected to have an 
impact on the level of that MEP's legislative activity. For instance, members of a more 
powerful committee which can have a significant impact on policy outcomes could be 
expected to be more active than those working on committees whose work has hardly any 
influence on legislation. 
 
Operationalization 
 
The assertions set out above are tested in this paper by means of a new dataset covering those 
MEPs who served the full period of the first half of the sixth EP from July 2004 to January 
2007, which compiles information on the member states that MEPs represent and on the 
characteristics and career paths of the individual MEPs. The sixth EP was selected as it is one 
of the most recent Parliaments on which sufficient data about post-EP careers could be 
collected at the start of this study. The EU15, rather than the EU25, was selected, as the MEPs 
from the ten accession states in 2004 had not been able to develop certain career paths and 
would therefore distort the analysis. The population size of the member state an MEP 
represents is included in the dataset in millions of inhabitants in 2004; this information was 
obtained from Eurostat. The first half of the sixth EP was selected (rather than the full sixth 
EP) as a number of MEPs normally moves to a different committee halfway an EP term. As 
this could lead to a drop in perceived activity (e.g. these MEPs joining a new committee are 
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not likely to table motions straightaway), it was decided to focus on the first half of the sixth 
EP to avoid a distortion of the data on this point. Data on committee membership was 
obtained from the EP website; the classification of EP committees in more or less powerful 
was devised by Yordanova (2009). Information about gender, age and national party of the 
MEPs, as well as the number of days in Parliament, was obtained from online sources such as 
the EP, MEPs’ personal and national party websites.  
The dataset also includes information on how many MEPs are from the same national 
party and whether the national party is represented in the Council. This information came 
from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2015). Bigger groups in the EP could 
dominate the work as they are better resourced and are better able to spread the workload 
among their members. Therefore the dataset includes information about the size of the 
national party and EPG of an MEP. Data on whether the national party is represented in the 
Council is included as well, as Høyland (2006) found that this could have an impact on an 
MEP’s activity level in the form of rapporteurships obtained. The analysis does not include 
further data on political parties, such as their ideological positioning, although by including 
the EPGs as control variables, these effects are indirectly captured in the analyses. The MEP-
specific variables focus in particular on Parliamentarians' professional background. 
Information on the career paths of MEPs was sourced from the EP website, MEPs’ personal 
websites and, in some cases, from interviews given by MEPs in national and international 
media. This includes information about the careers of MEPs before the 2004 elections and 
after the 2009 elections. Career paths were coded by indicating whether an MEP had had a 
national political career as MP, senator, Minister or Prime Minister. It was also recorded 
whether MEPs had had careers outside of politics, for example as doctors, engineers or 
education professionals. The data used in the analyses of this paper does not cover whether an 
MEP has been a local or regional politician even though politicians who were active at these 
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levels might have developed an experience similar to those active at national political level. 
Based on Schlesinger’s assumptions about progressive career ambitions and the fact that the 
national political office is still considered to be the highest political office, it is assumed that 
the regional political level is not the main level competing with the European level. It might 
however be the case that career patterns at the European level are similar to those at a regional 
level. Further research should be conducted to establish whether this is the case.  The five 
types of MEPs described above were constructed using career background information. For 
the first type, the young ‘stepping-stone’ politicians, a dummy variable was created, with all 
those MEPs under the age of 41 and no previous domestic political career being selected. 
They also all had a career in national politics after the 2009 EP election. The second type of 
MEPs, the ‘retirees’, are all those MEPs over the age of 60, who had a career in domestic 
politics prior to their election as an MEP. The EP-careerists, the third type, were selected by 
considering those with no previous domestic career who served at least two terms in the EP 
and who are now either in their third term or have been an MEP since 1999 and were re-
elected in the 2009 EP elections (i.e. having started their third term in 2009). The new, fourth, 
category of MEPs of former national politicians were selected as those between 40 and 55 
years old with a previous career in domestic politics, or between 55 and 59 years old with 
national political experience and more than one term in the EP (in order to distinguish them 
from the EP-retirees). The other, newly-identified, category of ‘one-off’ MEPs was selected 
by taking those MEPs who did not have a political career at national level or at EP level prior 
to 1999. MEPs in this category also did not get re-elected to the EP in 2009 and did not 
embark on a senior domestic political career after their time in the EP (i.e. they were active in 
politics for a maximum of two EP terms). The remaining group, that of MEPs whose career 
path could not yet be identified, was omitted from the empirical analysis in order to avoid 
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distortion of the data. This leaves 433 out of the 539 MEPs from the dataset included in the 
analysis.   
MEPs’ level of activity can be measured in a number of different ways; the data for this 
was provided by Votewatch.eu. Attendance rates are based on attending roll-call votes in 
plenary. The simple use of roll-call votes for studying the behaviour of MEPs has previously 
been criticized (see Carrubba et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it can be expected to provide a solid 
indication of how often MEPs attend the plenary, as roll-call votes are used in around one-
third of all votes (Hix et al., 2007). Two other measures of activity which are used in this 
paper are the number of reports amended and the number of motions tabled. These three 
measures of activity are included in the analyses as continuous dependent variables.     
These measures of activity were selected as they provide an indication of the overall 
level of activity in the Parliament. They are similar to the operationalization of ‘activity’ as 
used elsewhere (e.g. Bailer & Ohmura, 2013). Nevertheless, it is recognized that these 
measures are not exhaustive, given the wide range of activities that MEPs can be involved in 
(Corbett et al., 2011). However, as the attendance at plenaries and motions are indications of 
activities in the plenary and the number of reports amended indicate how active an MEP is in 
his committee, the three measures selected should provide a realistic indication of an MEP’s 
overall level of participation in the EP’s work. Attendance in plenary has also been found to 
be a predictor of the allocation of rapporteurships in committees (Yoshinaka et al., 2010) so 
these three types of activity should provide a reasonable indication of the dependent variable 
'activity’ overall that is used in this paper.  
 
Empirical analyses 
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In this section, we consider the empirical findings of the analyses conducted. Table one shows 
the impact of the different types of MEPs on their attendance rates in plenary roll-call votes. 
Column one in the table shows a basic model of the impact of some variables such as gender 
and age on the attendance of MEPs. Here, it seems that both the population size of the 
member state that an MEP represents and the size of the EPG he or she belongs to should 
have an effect on attendance rates. The explanatory power of this model is, however, limited. 
The question therefore arises how much this basic model can be improved by adding more 
information about the different types of MEPs. These effects are shown in column two, where 
the retiring MEP is left out as baseline variable. It was decided to use the group of retiring 
MEPs as baseline variable, as it is generally expected that these MEPs will be the least active 
MEPs.  
Table one shows that adding the different types of MEPs, as well as the other control 
variables to the basic model, significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. In 
this analysis, it is shown that EP careerists, former national politicians and one-off MEPs 
attend significantly more plenary votes than their colleagues. In particular, EP careerists 
attend more votes with nearly ten per cent higher attendance rates which equals to about one 
week per year in Strasbourg. Young MEPs do not attend significantly more votes than retiring 
MEPs from the baseline category and seem to be less active in this respect than colleagues 
from the above-mentioned categories.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table two shows the same set-up as for the analysis of testing the attendance rate. In 
this table, the number of reports amended in the committee is used as the dependent variable 
and analyzed in order to assess MEPs’ committee activity, which constitutes an important part 
of Parliamentary work. The basic model in column one shows that gender, age and population 
size have a significant impact on the number of reports amended. On average, men amended 
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nearly five fewer reports over the period 2004-07 than women. MEPs from bigger member 
states are also less likely to amend reports. Including the different types of MEPs and other 
control variables in the analyses again improves the explanatory power of the basic model. It 
finds that MEPs who do not have a long-term career in the EP, are more likely to submit 
amendments to reports than MEPs who do pursue a career in the EP, such as the EP-careerists 
and the former national politicians. Young MEPs and one-off MEPs submit on average 
amendments to around three to four more reports than their peers. This could be explained by 
the fact that possibly the MEPs pursuing a career in the EP are more often the rapporteurs 
themselves. They would therefore logically be less likely to submit amendments to reports.  
With regard to the other variables included in the analysis, it is interesting to note that 
an MEP who is a member of a powerful committee will submit amendments to a significantly 
higher number of reports. It finds that an MEP who is a member of a powerful committee 
amends at least two reports more than colleagues who are member of a less powerful 
committee. This could be explained by the fact that for MEPs on a more powerful committee, 
amending a report has an actual impact on policy outcomes. For this type of activity, it seems 
therefore that not only the type of MEP can go some way to explaining the variance, but also 
the influence that a committee has on policy decisions. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The third type of activity analyzed here is the number of motions tabled by an MEP. 
Again, the basic model, which only finds EPG size to be of significant impact on the number 
of motions tabled, is significantly improved by adding the MEP types and other control 
variables. It finds that EP-careerists are much more active in this type of activity than their 
peers, with around seven motions more tabled in the period analyzed. The young MEPs, 
former national politicians and one-off MEPs do not show significantly high number of 
motions tabled in Parliament. The dominance of EP-careerists for this type of activity could 
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be explained by the fact that this group try to make themselves more visible among the party 
and Parliament leadership in order to promote the development of their career in the EP. 
Young, retiring and one-off MEPs have much less interest in doing so. Former national 
politicians could also be expected to show similar levels of activity as EP careerists, but as 
discussed above, they are likely to face less pressure to be visible as they have already proved 
their qualities as national politicians. 
Another interesting and significant effect found here is the number of motions tabled by 
members of a powerful committee. MEPs who are members of a powerful committee table 
significantly fewer motions than their colleagues; around eleven fewer in the period 2004-07. 
This could be explained by the fact that these MEPs are able to achieve their policy aims by 
influencing the relevant legislation directly through rapporteurships or by tabling amendments 
(as is shown in Table two), whereas MEPs from less powerful committees need to table 
motions to be heard. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Discussion 
 
The empirical findings broadly confirm the expectations about the career ambitions and 
activities of different MEPs. Young and unexperienced MEPs who after a short period of time 
in the EP pursue a career in domestic politics, were not expected to be interested in getting 
involved too much in the work of the EP. The relatively lower attendance rate, as well as the 
limited number of motions tabled in Parliament, confirm these expectations. The only type of 
activity they seem to be more active in than many of their peers is submitting amendments to 
reports. This could be explained by the fact that these stepping-stone MEPs are less likely to 
be able to obtain rapporteurships and therefore tabling amendments to reports is their main 
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way of seeking to influence legislation. It could also be that this is a way by which they can at 
least show their national party leadership that they are able to conduct some of the 
parliamentary work that will also be required at national level, even though submitting 
amendments is not as significant as obtaining a rapporteurship position.  
 The EP careerists are very active in the EP’s work. They attend more plenary votes 
than any of the other types of MEPs and also table more motions than any of their colleagues. 
By doing this, these static career ambitious politicians want to make themselves visible to 
their EPG leadership who decides about the prospects for developing a career in the EP. The 
fact that EP careerists table fewer amendments to reports could be because they are more 
often the rapporteurs themselves – also given that higher plenary attendance rates are 
associated with more rapporteurships (Yoshinaka et al., 2010) – but this assumption needs to 
be confirmed by further research.  
 The former domestic politicians, who have had a senior career in domestic politics and 
thereafter look to build a career in the EP – which makes them distinct from retiring MEPs – 
are overall also found to be more active in the EP’s work than many of their colleagues. They 
attend slightly fewer plenary meetings and table fewer motions than the EP careerist though. 
They probably face less pressure to conduct a lot of the groundwork, such as tabling motions, 
as they have proved their qualities in the national political arena.  
 The one-off MEPs are found to be more active than would actually be expected from 
these discrete career ambitious politicians. However, they turn out to be active in areas which 
do not require significant qualities or previous political experience, such as attending plenary 
voting sessions and tabling amendments to reports; the latter can be expected to require less 
political “quality” than being a rapporteur. This would confirm the idea that the one-off MEP 
category is composed of people who turn out to be of less quality or ambition. Also, given the 
heterogeneous nature of this group, these findings need to be interpreted with caution. 
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 Overall the career ambitions of the different types of MEPs seem to be broadly 
confirmed by their observed behaviour. Those MEPs pursuing a career in the EP are generally 
active, in particular in those areas which fit with their career ambitions. MEPs who are not 
aiming for, or able to get, a long-term career in the EP, focus their activities on other areas, 
some of which are probably outside the EP.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Politicians change their behaviour in accordance with their career ambitions (Schlesinger, 
1966) and the EU provides an interesting multi-level context to study politicians’ career 
ambitions and legislative behaviour. Even though the national political level in the EU can 
still be considered to be the ‘highest’ political office, the gradual expansion of powers of the 
European Parliament has provided career politicians with an interesting additional opportunity 
to pursue a political career. MEPs are at a wide variety of different stages in their career when 
they enter the EP. Some have only just started their political career, whereas others are about 
to retire after serving many years in politics. A key contribution to the study of the career 
paths of MEPs is Scarrow (1997), who identified three types of MEPs. The techniques used 
by Scarrow and others to identify career paths mainly look at the past experience of MEPs in 
combination with age, from which they claim to be able to identify a future career trajectory 
of politicians, for example as a national or a retiring politician. It can be questioned whether 
Scarrow’s approach of basing a politician’s career ambitions on their career background is 
sufficient. Analyzing career background and its effect on observed behaviour could provide a 
better explanation and prediction about someone’s career ambitions. Scarrow’s categorization 
is limited in scope and does not seem to cover the full range of career paths and ambitions 
present in the EP.  
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A new type of MEP that seems to have emerged is of politicians who previously had a 
senior domestic political career and decide to pursue a further career at European level. These 
MEPs do not move to the EP arena in order to bridge the gap between the domestic career and 
retirement but are looking to build a truly European career. Another group of MEPs that can 
be identified is what one might call ‘one-off’ MEPs. This is a group of MEPs who are not 
career politicians and who do not have a domestic or European career in politics either before 
or after their time in the EP, either because they are not interested or because they lack 
quality. They usually stay in the EP for only a short period of time and do not build a political 
career. This group is however heterogeneous of nature and its findings need to be interpreted 
with caution. Further analysis on this specific group in future studies would be recommended. 
It could be expected that MEPs who are in different stages of their career, and who 
therefore have different levels of experience and career goals, show different levels of activity 
in the EP. This paper has, within the broader framework of political career ambitions in multi-
level systems, built on Scarrow’s work and shown that over and above the factors that have 
already previously been identified to have an influence on an MEP’s behaviour, such as 
member state of origin and EPG membership, the career path of an MEP can be a relevant 
factor in explaining certain legislative behaviour across member states and party groups. 
Those MEPs interested in developing a career in the EP are overall found to be more active, 
particularly in the key areas of the EP’s work, whereas those who only stay in the EP for a 
short period of time are either less active or active in areas of less importance. Other control 
variables were included in the analyses which showed that membership of a powerful 
legislative committee also makes MEPs' significantly more likely to be actively involved in 
tabling amendments to legislative reports than their colleagues who sit on less powerful 
committees. MEPs on powerful committees are, however, less actively involved in tabling 
motions.  
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The findings in this paper could be of relevance beyond the EP and have broader 
implications for our understanding of politicians’ career ambitions and their legislative 
behaviour in a multilevel system. The different types of careers found in this paper can be 
used when studying other political levels, for example national or regional. This paper also 
gives an insight into how legislative careers of politicians can change when the balance of 
power between different levels of government changes. When a particular level of 
government becomes more powerful, it creates new interesting career opportunities for 
politicians. A similar effect could possibly be found at regional levels in the case of 
decentralization.  
 
The conclusions reached in this paper provide a number of suggestions for further 
research. First, it would be interesting to see whether MEPs from the EU member states that 
joined in the last ten years are developing the same or different career patterns and ambitions 
as described in this paper and whether the analyses could be repeated for other EPs. Second, 
the dependent variable in this paper of ‘activity’ could be strengthened by testing other types 
of activities (e.g. rapporteurships and questions asked) in future research.  Third, to extend the 
analysis from this paper beyond the EP, it could be considered whether the different types of 
politicians as described here are also present in other ‘second-order’ legislative institutions 
such as regional parliaments. Finally, the basic models in the analyses include population size 
and the size of the EPG as control variables. For further research it would be interesting to 
analyze whether differences in the types of MEPs can be found between member states and 
political groups. 
As Scarrow has also previously shown, MEPs’ career paths are relevant and differ 
between member states and should not be ignored in future studies on the activities of MEPs. 
The analysis in this paper shows that, across countries and party groups, it is possible to 
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identify types of MEPs with different backgrounds and career ambitions which can in certain 
situations explain an MEP’s behaviour. Therefore, over and above these factors of influence 
that have already been acknowledged to have an impact on an MEP's activities in the EP, 
career paths are a further relevant factor to be taken into account when studying the legislative 
behaviour of MEPs.  
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Table 1. Attendance rates
2
 
 (1) (2) 
 Attendance Attendance 
Young MEP  0.908 
  (2.448) 
EP careerist  9.458*** 
  (1.654) 
Former national 
politician 
 6.537*** 
(1.745) 
One-off MEP  7.504*** 
  (1.692) 
Male 0.500 1.713 
 (1.220) (1.134) 
Age -0.114*  
 (0.0593)  
EPG size 0.0307***  
 (0.00847)  
Member state size -0.0433**  
 (0.0204)  
Memb. powerful cmte  1.209 
  (1.083) 
Constant 90.45*** 76.93*** 
 (3.422) (2.970) 
EPG controls 
included 
No Yes 
Member states 
controls included 
No Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.044 0.283 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.   
The baseline for the four different types of MEPs is the retiring MEP. 
 
  
                                                          
2
 Other models were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG and national 
party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government and thereby in the Council 
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Table 2. Number of reports amended
3
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Young MEP  3.885** 
  (1.929) 
EP careerist  2.079 
  (1.303) 
Former nat’l politician  0.866 
  (1.375) 
One-off MEP  3.096** 
  (1.333) 
Male -4.575*** -3.856*** 
 (0.913) (0.894) 
Age  -0.0854*  
 (0.0444)  
Member state size -0.0332**  
 (0.0152)  
EPG size 0.00894  
 (0.00634)  
Mem. powerful cmte  2.454*** 
  (0.853) 
Constant 17.71*** 9.869*** 
 (2.562) (2.340) 
EPG controls included No Yes 
Member states controls 
included 
No Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.086 0.242 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  The baseline for the four different types 
of MEPs is the “retiring MEP”. 
 
  
                                                          
3
 Other models were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG and national 
party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government and thereby in the Council 
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Table 3. Motions tabled
4
 
 (1) (2) 
 Motions  Motions  
Young MEP  -0.279 
  (4.423) 
EP careerist  7.083** 
  (2.988) 
Former nat’l politician  2.161 
  (3.152) 
One-off MEP  -1.683 
  (3.057) 
Male   -0.830 -1.449 
 (2.154) (2.049) 
Age  -0.0441  
 (0.105)  
EPG size -0.0633***  
 (0.0150)  
Member state size 0.0483  
 (0.0360)  
Mem. powerful cmte  -11.47*** 
  (1.956) 
Constant 18.92*** 14.06*** 
 (6.042) (5.365) 
EPG controls included No Yes 
Member states controls 
included 
No Yes 
Observations 433 433 
R-squared 0.044 0.250 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  The baseline for the four different types 
of MEPs is the “retiring MEP”. 
 
  
                                                          
4
 Other models were controlled for. These include models where data on the member state, EPG and national 
party size was included and whether the national party was represented in government and thereby in the Council 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1A. Attendance rates, with results for dummy variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Attendance Attendance Attendance Attendance Attendance Attendance Attendance Attendance 
Young MEP  3.394 3.056 0.980 3.181 2.854 1.179 0.908 
EP careerist  11.35*** 11.10*** 9.581*** 9.856*** 9.421*** 9.507*** 9.458*** 
Former nat’l politician  8.235*** 7.746*** 6.961*** 8.725*** 8.272*** 6.910*** 6.537*** 
One-off MEP  6.630*** 6.714*** 7.192*** 6.335*** 6.374*** 7.163*** 7.504*** 
Male 0.500 1.069 1.634 1.350 0.892 1.424 1.255 1.713 
Age -0.114*        
Member state size -0.0433** -0.0617*** -0.0660***      
National party size     0.0672 0.0782 0.0740 0.104 
EPG size 0.0307*** 0.0246***  0.0191** 0.0176*  0.0134  
Nat’l party in gov’t  2.450* 2.841** 1.194 3.952*** 4.511*** 1.342 1.742 
Mem. powerful cmte  1.176 1.129 1.460 1.370 1.336 1.400 1.209 
Austria    8.043***   9.292*** 9.222*** 
Belgium    -2.340   -1.084 -0.926 
Denmark    4.378   5.491 7.384* 
Finland    6.976**   8.202** 9.315*** 
France    -1.791   -1.548 -1.141 
Greece    3.330   4.456 4.933 
Ireland    1.416   2.442 4.872 
Italy    -10.90***   -9.813*** -9.144*** 
Luxembourg    2.131   3.494 4.025 
Netherlands    -0.374   0.659 1.662 
Portugal    1.160   2.471 3.328 
Spain    -0.130   0.209 0.310 
Sweden    -2.030   -0.696 1.488 
United Kingdom    -1.038   -0.602 0.218 
PES   0.778   0.886  0.786 
ALDE   -3.980**   -3.099*  -2.551 
Greens   1.988   3.430  2.765 
GUE   -2.958   -2.180  -0.590 
UEN   -7.723**   -6.318*  -3.432 
Independents   -10.81***   -8.866***  -10.31*** 
Non attached   -1.519   -0.553  1.252 
Constant 90.45*** 77.20*** 81.21*** 76.88*** 74.48*** 76.87*** 76.12*** 76.93*** 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.044 0.146 0.180 0.250 0.132 0.165 0.252 0.283 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  The baseline for the four different types 
of MEPs is the “retiring MEP”, the baseline for the EPG controls is the EPP, and the baseline for the member 
states controls is Germany. 
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Table 2A. Number of reports amended, with results for dummy variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Reports 
amended 
Young MEP  5.797*** 4.975*** 4.451** 5.668*** 4.884** 4.236** 3.885** 
EP careerist  3.149** 2.635** 2.250* 2.934** 2.331* 2.330* 2.079 
Former nat’l politician  1.520 1.112 1.096 1.810 1.406 1.152 0.866 
One-off MEP  4.591*** 4.279*** 3.358** 4.518*** 4.173*** 3.390** 3.096** 
Male -4.575*** -4.264*** -3.858*** -4.295*** -4.235*** -3.853*** -4.192*** -3.856*** 
Age  -0.0854*        
Member state size -0.0332** -0.0385** -0.0377**      
National party size     -0.0801* -0.0655 -0.0802 -0.0571 
EPG size 0.00894 0.00967  0.00188 0.0157**  0.00812  
Nat’l party in gov’t  0.871 1.191 0.394 1.292 1.648 0.233 0.369 
Mem. powerful cmte  2.096** 2.243*** 2.372*** 2.176** 2.314*** 2.437*** 2.454*** 
Austria    2.700   1.345 2.697 
Belgium    -1.960   -3.322 -2.417 
Denmark    -1.931   -3.138 -2.320 
Finland    0.648   -0.681 -0.276 
France    -1.662   -1.925 -0.488 
Greece    9.298***   8.077*** 8.825*** 
Ireland    -3.358   -4.471 -3.455 
Italy    -1.431   -2.613 -1.465 
Luxembourg    4.055   2.576 2.616 
Netherlands    4.722**   3.601 4.092* 
Portugal    -0.155   -1.577 -0.679 
Spain    2.825   2.457 2.755 
Sweden    0.712   -0.734 0.495 
United Kingdom    -1.128   -1.602 -0.715 
PES   -1.362   -1.452  -1.207 
ALDE   -1.876   -2.506*  -1.226 
Greens   3.866**   3.133*  3.421* 
GUE   0.888   -0.121  0.622 
UEN   -4.643*   -5.127*  -1.763 
Independents   -4.457*   -4.807**  -3.808 
Non attached   -7.852***   -8.830***  -7.621*** 
Constant 17.71*** 8.672*** 10.73*** 8.367*** 7.020*** 10.02*** 9.194*** 9.869*** 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.086 0.128 0.186 0.193 0.123 0.180 0.196 0.242 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  The baseline for the four different types 
of MEPs is the “retiring MEP”, the baseline for the EPG controls is the EPP, and the baseline for the member 
states controls is Germany. 
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Table 3A. Motions tabled, with results for dummy variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Motions  Motions  Motions  Motions  Motions  Motions Motions  Motions  
Young MEP  -0.284 -2.010 1.287 -0.257 -1.968 0.865 -0.279 
EP careerist  6.097** 5.713** 7.177** 7.336** 6.795** 7.334** 7.083** 
Former nat’l politician  2.330 1.250 2.733 2.260 1.234 2.842 2.161 
One-off MEP  -0.606 -1.069 -1.219 -0.407 -0.922 -1.156 -1.683 
Male   -0.830 -2.211 -1.357 -2.742 -1.981 -1.151 -2.540 -1.449 
Age  -0.0441        
Member state size 0.0483 0.00580 0.000458       
National party size     -0.194* -0.180* -0.157 -0.128 
EPG size -0.0633*** -0.0665***  -0.0617*** -0.0499***  -0.0495**  
Nat’l party in gov’t  -1.494 -1.654 -0.0204 -2.425 -2.477 -0.334 -0.809 
Mem. powerful cmte  -11.10*** -11.16*** -11.52*** -11.18*** -11.24*** -11.39*** -11.47*** 
Austria    -0.0130   -2.659 1.313 
Belgium    2.658   -0.00355 3.866 
Denmark    -4.758   -7.116 -3.852 
Finland    1.313   -1.284 0.872 
France    -2.322   -2.836 1.962 
Greece    -2.902   -5.287 -3.737 
Ireland    3.196   1.023 0.281 
Italy    9.834***   7.525* 9.008** 
Luxembourg    -2.395   -5.283 -3.896 
Netherlands    2.463   0.275 2.265 
Portugal    -0.567   -3.345 -2.017 
Spain    0.377   -0.342 0.850 
Sweden    -1.490   -4.317 0.223 
United Kingdom    -1.893   -2.818 0.736 
PES   0.150   -0.0979  -0.130 
ALDE   4.061   2.203  1.819 
Greens    19.02***   16.47***  17.31*** 
GUE   25.48***   23.10***  22.46*** 
UEN   22.57***   20.46***  18.07*** 
Independents    -4.285   -6.684  -5.275 
Non attached   -5.473   -7.978*  -9.260* 
Constant 18.92*** 25.08*** 13.49*** 24.00*** 25.40*** 16.42*** 25.62*** 14.06*** 
Observations 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
R-squared 0.044 0.126 0.224 0.157 0.133 0.230 0.159 0.250 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  The baseline for the four different types 
of MEPs is the “retiring MEP”, the baseline for the EPG controls is the EPP, and the baseline for the member 
states controls is Germany. 
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Table 4. Types of MEPs by Member State
5
 
 Number of MEPs Percent of MEPs 
Member state 
Young 
MEP 
Retiring 
MEP 
EP 
careerist 
Former 
national 
politician 
One-off 
MEP Total 
Not yet 
identified1 
Young 
MEP 
Retiring 
MEP 
EP 
careerist 
Former 
national 
politician 
One-off 
MEP 
Luxembourg 0 4 1 1 0 6 0 0 66.7  16.7 16.7 0 
Denmark 1 3 3 1 1 9 3 11.1 33.3 33.3 11.1 11.1 
Ireland 1 2 0 6 2 11 2 9.1 18.2 0 54.5 18.2% 
Finland 1 5 1 5 1 13 2 7.7 38.5 7.7 38.5 7.7 
Austria 1 2 2 7 3 15 2 6.7 13.3 13.3 46.7 20.0 
Sweden 4 3 0 5 3 15 2 26.7 20.0 0 33.3 20.0 
Portugal 0 3 0 10 2 15 7 0 20.0 0 66.7 13.3 
Greece 0 2 2 4 9 17 7 0 11.8 11.8 23.5 52.9 
Belgium 0 5 4 6 3 18 5 0 27.8 22.2 33.3 16.7 
Netherlands 3 0 5 1 11 20 7 15.0 0 25.0 5.0 55.0 
Spain 3 7 13 8 7 38 16 7.9 18.4 34.2 21.1 18.4 
Italy 0 12 8 7 27 54 10 0 22.2 14.8 13.0 50.0 
France 1 14 12 10 23 60 17 1.7 23.3 20.0 16.7 38.3 
United Kingdom 4 9 36 5 9 63 11 6.3 14.3 57.1 7.9 14.3 
Germany 10 4 46 10 10 80 14 12.5 5.0 57.5 12.5 12.5 
Total 29 75 133 86 111 434 105 6.7 17.3 30.6 19.8 25.6 
 
Note: 1. The career paths of these MEPs could not be identified yet, mainly because these MEPs have only been in the EP for a short period of time. It could therefore be that this category is 
composed of starting EP careerists, one-off MEPs and others that do not fall within any of the other five categories 
 
                                                          
5
 Table 4 shows the five categories described and the residual group of MEPs whose career path has not yet been identified, mainly because they were only elected in 2004. The countries in 
the table are ordered by total number of MEPs. These numbers may differ slightly from the total number of MEPs, as MEPs who left within the first half of the sixth EP have been omitted from 
the dataset to avoid a distortion of the analysis. The table shows that there are relatively few young MEPs. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have, relatively, the most young MEPs who 
use their EP career as a stepping-stone to national politics. For retiring MEPs, a relatively large number are from Denmark, Luxembourg or Finland. The EP-careerist category seems to be 
dominated by Germany and the UK, and - to a lesser extent - Denmark and Spain. The newly-identified category of former national politicians seems to be relatively dominated by MEPs from 
smaller member states. Significant proportions from member states such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden fall within this category. The one-off category is dominated 
by MEPs from France, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. 
